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NAIGAMA NAYA
It views an object as possessing both the general and particular properties, because no object is possessed of a general property unaccompanied with some particular property, nor even of a specific property unaccompanied with the general one common to its class. As for example, I am conscious' is a statement of naigama saya. Here the property 'consciousness' is a general quality that exists in all living beings, whereas 'I' indicates my particular nature, i.e., individuality.
SANGRAHA NAYA
It deals with the general properties of an object. As for instance, 'reality is one because it exists' is a proposition of Sangraha naya. It does not look at the particular properties of reality but regards the general property as its subject-matter. In its pure form, it is only concerned with the simple statement 'it is,' that is to say, when the thing is mentioned divested of all its particular attributes or modifications. All other statements deal, in one way or the other, with some attribute or the other, and as such is the subject of all navas.
OUTLINES OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY
VYAVAHARA NAYA
It takes into consideration a general object as possessing specific properties.3 It does not deal with generality in the sense as sangraha naya deals with it. Its subject-matter is only a part of the object of sangraha. In other words, it classifies the subjectmatter of sangraha in a particular fashion. 'Existence is either substance or modification' is an instance of vavahara naya.1 Here existence' is classified into two, viz., substance and modification.
RJUSUTRA NAYA
It does not trouble itself with the past and the future aspect of a thing; it is only confined to the present aspect of a thing because that alone is useful for the moment.5 The argument underlying the rjusūtra view-point is that of immediate utility
1
2 ibid., 6.
3 ibid., 8.
4
Naya-karṇikā, 5.
Pramāṇa-naya-tattvaloka, VII, 23-4.
ibid., VII, 28
