New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

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New Dimensions in Jaina Logic
The Types of Knowledge
There is no unanimity among the systems of philosophy regarding the types of knowledge. The Cārvāka system recognizes only one, namely perception. The Buddhists and the Vaišeşikas approve of only two types of knowledge-perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumana). Jainism too agrees to two kinds--direct (pratyaksa) and indirect (paroksa). The Samkhya philosophy admits three-Perception, Inference, and Scripture (Agama). The Naiyāyikas accept four--Perception, Inference, Scripture and Analogy (upamāna). Among the Mimāmsakas, Prabhākara admits five adding Implication (arthāpatti) to the above four, while Kumārila adds one more called Negation (abhāva), thus bringing the number to six. Maharși Caraka recognises one more, namely Ratiocination (yukti) and the Paurāņikas add Historical Record (aitihya), thus bringing the total number to eight. This number may be further augmented. The question, however, is about the absence of consensus among the logicians about the number of the types of knowledge. The problem deserves further investigation.
Variety of Knowledge on account of the Variety of its Sources
There are four sources of knowledge1. Sensual Knowledge. 2. Mental Knowledge. 3. Intellectual Knowledge (prajñā). 4. Extra-sensory Knowledge.
The philosophers who considered the sensual knowledge alone as the ultimate determinant had no other alternative than to acknowledge only one type of knowledge, namely, perception. Among the Indian thinkers only the Cārvāka regarded the sensual knowledge alone as the source of the search for truth. They believe that what is perceived through senses is alone real; the rest is unreal. The extra-sensory knowledge is nothing but sheer imagination. When the sensual knowledge alone is capable of knowing, there can be no other source of knowledge than perception. The Cärvāka system had to face a number of difficulties on account of its accepting perception alone as the source of knowlege. They had to accept the utility of inference (anumāna) to support their theory. That acceptance was merely formal for practical purposes, but not as a matter of logical necessity.
Francis Bacon, the reputed philosopher of the sixteenth