Comparative Study of Indian Science

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: C S Mallinath

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Jainism it is as much essential to the attainment of Moksha as Right Knowledge.
From this practical tendency of the Jaina philosophy, we think, its doctrines of the Syadvada and of the Naya originated. The Pramanas give us the nature of things: but a practical man is not satisfied with this Knowledge only. He wants to know not simply what a thing is in and to itself but what it is or what it would be in connection with other things. A thing cannot be considered as absolutely self-centred; nor can it be thought of as a sum-total of extraneous relations. It is both itself and not itself. Hence a careful study of both these complementary aspects of a thing can give us a full knowledge of the thing. It is the distinctive characteristic of the Jaina philosophy to describe knowledge to be of two forms viz., the Pramana (the Knowledge of a thing as it is in and to itself) and the Naya (the Knowledge of a thing in its limitations, relations and modifications.)
Coming to the nature of True Knowledge, the Jaina philosophers e.g., Vadi-deva Suri maintain,~
"The Validity of Knowledge consists in its agreement with the Object."
The True or Valid Knowledge is thus opposed to False Knowledge or Samaropa, consisting in "taking a thing for what it is not." Samaropa is essentially similar to Avidya as it is conceived in 5, Sadhanapada of the