Comparative Study of Indian Science

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: C S Mallinath

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not opposed to the Individuals, it may be regarded as many while the Individuals not being opposed to the Universal may be treated as one."
Coming now once more back to the doctrine of Pratyabhijna we find some schools of Indian philosophy of a strong Buddhistic bias, rejecting the Pramana-hood of Pratyabhijna. Conception or assimi. lation is not a process yielding any positive matter but it gives only negative ideas i.e., cognitions of nonparticularity. The Jainas criticise this doctrine by pointing out that Conception does give positive 'matter. The thinkers of the Sankhya school also join with the Jainas in repudiating this negative theory of Concep-tion. "A Concept," says Kapila," does not consist in the negation of something, because it gives us the idea of something positive (93, Parapaksha-nirjayadhyaya, Sankhya-Sutras),"
The Sankhya logicians, however, differ from the Jaina in regarding the Samanya as a matter of perception. In other words, although Kapila recognises the validity of the matter of Pratyabhijna or Upamana, he regards it not as an independent Pramana but as a species of Pratyaksha, (Vide 94-95, Parapakshanirjayadhyaya, Sankhya-Sutras). The Jaina philosophers point out that Pratyabhijna is not to be identified with Pratyaksha, as it involves an element of