Comparative Study of Indian Science

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: C S Mallinath

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safely be said that neither of the two modes of classifying Anumana has a tendency to reduce the process of Ratiocination to a dull mechanism. The Indian logicians speak of facts and ideas and not of 'terms '; they deal with necessary connections between phenomena and not with rhetorical or mechanical 'distri~ butions of middle terms.' We do not meet with Moods and Figures in the systems of Indian syllogism. The Indian logic is practical in its nature; symbolic logic was a monstrosity for the Indians.
The practical nature of Indian logic will be further apparent from the Jaina conception of the Sadhya. According to Vadi-deva, "The Proven is undetermined (i.e., previously unknown); it must not be opposed to the facts of experience; it must be something which is desired to be proven."
Coming back to the nature of Anumana, we may say that its elements are (1) The Hetu or the Mark, (2) The Paksha or the Minor Term and (3) The Sadhya or the Major Term or the Proven. The doctrine of Hetu has been fully dealt with in the last section.
The Paksha is what contains the Proven. Hill'in the stock-example is the Paksha because it contains 'Fire,' the Proven. It is seriously contended by some of the logicians of the Buddhist school that the