Comparative Study of Indian Science

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: C S Mallinath

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Jaina philosophers, however, reject the Buddhist theory of the Pratyaksha and deny that there can be any Nirvikalpa or undetermined Perception at all. The sensuous perception that we have do not show that there is any perception which is absolutely undetermined. The mental or internal perceptions also cannot cnable us to understand or feel Nirvikalpa for the simple reason that nothing can be a matter for internal perception which was not previously a matter for sensuous perception. Immediate selfconsciousness also shows that perception is always Savikalpa ; for immediately after we have a sensation, nay, along with itmwe have the consciousness of the object which causes that sensation or of the subject which has it. Hence the Jaina conclusion is that there cannot be any such thing as Nirvikalpa or Pure Sensation. The Jaina theory reminds us of the famous theory of Herbart viz., that of Apperception, according to which a matter of consciousness is not like an atom separated from other atoms but is a compounding and assimilating unity, losing itself in the pre-existing psychical mass.
Some of the Mimansaka psychologists also seem to agree with the Jaina thinkers in their theory of perception. All perception is determined by generalisation and a pure sensation is an impossibility,