Comparative Study of Indian Science

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: C S Mallinath

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admit this when he speaks of a mode of Upamana, called Vaidharmya-Upamana i.e., Upamana dealing with or based on Dissimilarity. The Mimansakas, on the contrary, explain Dissimilary as simply the want of Similarity. Accordingly, they maintain that Upamana deals with Similarity and Similars only and that judg. ments regarding Dissimilarity and Dissimilars are accounted for by the Abhava-Pramana. The Jainas point out that a similar line of argument may yield that Similarity is the want of Dissimilarity and that judgment of Similarity are accounted for not by Upamana but by Abhava. Hence it appears that the Jaina doctrine of Pratyabhijna is the only comprenhensive one.
The Buddhist philosophers object to the Jaina theory of Conception on the ground that our sensations being strictly individualistic and momentary, no real comparison of sensations and no real conception is possible. The Buddhist doctrine is similar to that of Heraclitus of ancient Greece and leads to the Nominalistic position of Roscelin of mediaeval Europe. The Buddhist theory of Impermanence is, however, a suicidal doctrine as in strict consistency, it itself can lay no claim to one's permanent acceptance of it. Then, again, the extreme individuality of each phenomenon is denied by the Buddhist himself when he applies the same name to a number of things. This shows that