________________
मार्च २०१०
१७९
discriminated, if necessary with the help of the method of perspective variation in time. To what extent ancient Jain philosophers would have agreed with Aristotle on this point is a question which can only be clearly answered in a separate study. It seems to me that the Jain theory of time is fundamental, also for Jain perspectivism.
(d) The most interesting of the four modes of speech (and cognition) is 'speaking neither truth nor untruth' (asaccamosā). That is, speech to which the true / false distinction is not applicable. Twelve types of the asatya-měsā bhāṣā are distinguished in Pann 866 = Viy 10.3.3 (4996):61 1. âmantaņi <āmantraņi>
Address 2. āņavaņi <ājñāpani)
Order 3. jāyaṇi <yācana
Request 4. pucchaņi <prcchani>
Question 5. pannavani <prajñāpani>
Communication 6. paccakkhāņi <pratyākhyāni>
Renunciation 7. icchāņulomā <icchānuloma
Consent 8. aṇabhiggahiyā <anabhigrhita
Unintelligible 9. abhiggahiyā <abhigrhita
Intelligible 10. saņsaya-karaṇi <samsaya-karaņi> Doubt-Creating 11. voyadā <vyākstā
Explicit 12. avvoyadā <avyākšta>
Implicit Nine of the twelve categories are also listed in Māc 5.118-119. The categories 1–7 are identical in both texts. Of the last five, only samsaya (No. 10) is mentioned by Vattakera, and a category labelled anakkhara <anaksara>, 'incomprehensible', which can be read as an cquivalent of anabhiggahiyā <anabhigrhita (No. 8, maybe also incorporating aspects of No. 12).62
Speaking neither-truth-nor-untruth is interpreted by JACOBI (1884: 150 n. 2, 151)63 and MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 325 f.) as referring to injunctions. However, considering the
Jain Education International 2010_03
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
