Book Title: Society Epistemology And Logic In Indian Tradition Author(s): Dharmchand Jain Publisher: Prakrit Bharati AcademyPage 10
________________ brief account about the development of Jaina epistemology and its contribution to Indian epistemological tenets alongwith discussing the pramāṇas in general. - There is a discussion in Indian epistemology on perception (pratyakşa), whether it is nirvikalpaka(devoid of verbal designation) or savikalpaka (determinate)? Buddhist philosopher Dignāga has propounded that perception through sense organs is always nirvikalpaka. Kalpanā (mental or verbal construction) is an addition to it, and that is not a part of perception. This concept of nirvikalpatā has been discussed in a separate article entitled "The concept of Nirvikalpatā in Buddhist Logic and the Indian Tradition" in this book. Here it is notable that Jaina philosophers accept pramāņa as a determinate knowledge which is devoid of doubt, pervertedness and indeterminateness,hence pramāņa should be sarvikalpaka (determinate) in their view. Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti has given arguments in favour of nirvikalpaka perception. Other schools of Indian Philosophy like Yoga, Nyāya and Mimāmsā have also discussed nirvikalpatā. Nayavāda is a specific original contribution of Jainism to the panorama of Indian epistemological doctrines. Nayavāda is a view point or stand point to know and to describe a reality. Jaina philosophers discuss mainly two and seven kinds of nayas, which have been described in an article on “Naya, Nayābhāsa and Nikṣepa" Naya is also a science to grasp the real meaning of sentence, whereas nikṣepa is a term to investigate the appropriate meaning of a word. Naya and Nikṣepa are related to linguistic aspect also. When a naya bears an absolustic view point then it is treated as nayābhāsa. An article entitled "The Concept of Consciousness in Jainism" presents the nature of consciousness, its various levels viiiPage Navigation
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