Outlines of Jainism

Author(s): S Gopalan
Publisher: Wiley Eastern Private Limited New Delhi

Page 60

JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY : AN OVER-VIEW
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Direct or Immediate perception proper is Kerala-jñāna and it is characterized as pure and perfect. But since there are stages of attaining such perfect knowledge1? these are also referred to as immediate perception, in a qualified sense. These are Avadhi-jñāna and Manaḥparyāya-jñāna. Pratyakşa is also referred to as pāramārthika (transcendental) as against parokșa which is referred to also as vyāvahārika (empirical). The term pratyakṣa is appended to both the terms pāramārthika and vyāvahārika to indicate the type of perception resulting without the aid of the sense organs and the mind (pāramārthika-pratyaksa) and the perception resulting from the activity of the sense organs (vyāvahāra-pratyakşa). 18
Paroksa is defined as "other than pratyaksa."19 Since pratyaksa as discussed above relates to knowledge dependent on the self alone, parokșa as "other than pratyakşa” signifies knowledge which is dependent on the sense organs (indriyas) and the mind (manas). Parokșa-jñāna understood as empirical knowledge is defined as that which is conditioned by the senses and the mind and is limited. In terms of this two-fold division, inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna) and verbal testimony (sabda) are all classified under parokşa.
Knowledge derived through the sense organs and the mind was thus considered indirect by the Jaina philosophers and this was directly against the view held by the other schools of Indian philosophy which generally held the view that the sense organs give us immediate or direct knowledge whereas all the other ‘sources' lead to only indirect or mediate knowledge.
In the third stage of the evolution of Jaina epistemology perception is considered as giving direct knowledge (for practical purpose) though it is still maintained that knowledge derived through the
17 There is a clear suggestion in Nyāyāvatāra, 28 for this concept of 'degrees of knowledge'. The result of pramāņa is stated to be the removal of ignorance (ajñāna-nivartană), of kevala-jñāna - bliss and equanimity and of other kinds of knowledge, -- selection and rejection of objects.
18 See Nyāyāvatāra along with vrtti on verse 27. There is no contradiction involved in the division of prat yakşa itself into two as indicated above after referring to pratyakșa as pāramārthika and parokșa as vyāvahārika since the spirit of Jaina epistemology requires us to understand that from the point of view of the unbounded possibilities of the human self no external aids are required to produce knowledge' since the self in its pristine purity is identical with knowledge.
19 Nyāyāvatāra, 4