Outlines of Jainism

Author(s): S Gopalan
Publisher: Wiley Eastern Private Limited New Delhi

Page 84

KEVALA-JNANA
ception it is whether it is the enquirer's or that of somebody else. If it is of the enquirer, either it means perception of the moment the doubt about omniscience is expressed or perception relating to all times and places. The first alternative is not contended by the Jaina inasmuch as it stands for the presence of the non-omniscient being. In regard to the second alternative, the statement is made either after experiencing the past, present and the future or without such an experience. The first alternative means that the person who opposes omniscience is himself omniscient and the second alternative points to his dogmatism.
If it is maintained that it is the perception of the others that is responsible for disbelief in omniscience, the argument is still invalid because in that case experience of an 'other' person relating to omniscience, it may just as well be taken to be true. So pratyakṣa does not preclude the possibility of omniscience altogether.
The Mīmāmsaka points out that knowledge of an omniscient person through anumāna (inference) is also not possible because the presence of an important requirement of inference, viz., the hetu cannot be admitted in the context. Since inference is arrived at by the unconditional, invariable relation between the hetu (ground) and the sadhya (proven), and since hetu which is invariably present along with the sadhya,-in this case omniscience-cannot be found, omniscience cannot be known at all. Added to this is the difficulty that omniscience cannot be perceived through the sense organs.
The Jaina reply to this is that if experience of omniscience is pointed out to be impossible, to get a hetu which may be negatively connected with omniscience is also impossible. As such the very act of denying the existence of omniscience confirms its presence. Upamāna or analogy is also ruled out by the Mimāṁsaka to be of any value in our context. Since the emphasis in upamāna is on the knowledge about the essential similarities between the objects compared, and since such a thing is not possible in regard to the omniscient being, this source of knowledge also cannot be useful. The Mimāmsaka seems to imply that since no one has seen an omniscient person it is all the more difficult to identify any aspect of similarity between him and another who resembles him.
The Jainas meet this objection by pointing out that the most significant point about analogy is that it deals with similarity between things. In virtue of this it is not justifiable to maintain that omniscience itself is impossible.
75