Outlines of Jainism

Author(s): S Gopalan
Publisher: Wiley Eastern Private Limited New Delhi

Page 88

12
Inference
TNFERENCE, even as the common man understands it, gives us I knowledge ‘indirectly.' From the evidences actually presented to man's senses and with the general stock of knowledge he already possesses, he is able to pass from the known to the unknown. The passage from the known to the unknown introduces him to new knowledge and enables him to extend his domain of knowledge. But the whole process is governed by certain principles which ensure a consistent and cogent method by which valid inferences are made.
Paradoxical it may seem but true it is that in spite of the diametrically opposite standpoints that the Jaina system and the traditional Hindu systems take on the question of preception, in regard to the nature of inference they hold the same view. The fundamental Jaina view (traditional) is that what is perceived through the senses is indirect (parokşa) and that which is perceived without the medium of the senses is direct (pratyakşa). In this sense mati-jñāna is comprehensive enough to cover inferential knowledge. Mati-jñāna proper is considered to pertain to the objects of the senses and is either perceptual or reflective,--the latter covering knowledge by inference. In the traditional Hindu systems since knowledge presented to the senses is considered direct, perceptual knowledge alone is described as direct and inference which is only based on perception is regarded as giving us indirect knowledge.
Jainism considers inference to be of two kinds: inference for oneself (svārthānumāna) and inference for another (parārthānumāna).