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important fact of development of self-consciousness. The theory of 'continuity of consciousness' signifies also that there are the dormant as well as fully awakened stages of consciousness, the former connoting the stage when there is not even an awareness and the latter indicating the advanced stage in the self-reflective phase in the development of consciousness. The stage of sensation and darśana signify that the passive stage of consciousness has been crossed and the stage of sensitivity has been reached.
That the two are different is evident from the logic of the development of consciousness itself. In the Jaina terminology, 'mere awareness of existence' (sattāmātra) is clearly a stage antecedent to the stage of becoming aware of the various types of sensation. No doubt, this stage, like the previous one is also indeterminate and stands in clear contrast to the determinate stage of perception or jñāna which is to follow. Yet the difference between mere awareness and awareness of sensation though subtle is extremely significant.
We find, even within the Jaina tradition a few philosophers who do not distinguish clearly between sensation and apprehension. A consideration of their views helps us to understand the limitations under which alone a comparison between darśana and jñāna on the one hand and sensation and perception on the other can be validly made.
Umāswāmi refers to sensation as the implicit awareness of their respective objects by the sense organs. Similarly in the Āvaśyakaniryukti sensation is defined as the awareness of sense data. The specific characteristics of the objects are not noted.2 Simple awareness of the existence of the object constitutes sensation, according to the views just noted.
That the view has ignored the distinction between sensation and apprehension becomes evident when we analyse it in terms of apprehension and comprehension. We have no doubt maintained that apprehension is indeterminate and comprehension is determinate, but to equate sensation with apprehension would be tantamount to maintaining that apprehension is a category of comprehension. Siddhasena, for instance, maintains that the same cognition is named apprehension in the preliminary stage. The prelimi
1 Tattyārtha-Sutra, I. 15 2 Avašyakaniryukti, 3
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