Outlines of Jainism

Author(s): S Gopalan
Publisher: Wiley Eastern Private Limited New Delhi

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JAINISM
The former is referred to as subjective inference and the latter as syllogistic inference. This is clear from the Nyāyāvatāra which points out: "Direct knowledge and Inference are sources of both knowledge for oneself and for others. Like the acts of direct cognition and inference, the statements which express them are also called by those names, for, they are means of communication to the others.'1 The latter verses cited are especially significant in our context inasmuch as they unambiguously state that the propositional forms, constituting together an argument, deserve reference as in ference. The implication of the verses is that there is accorded full recognition to the syllogistic forms of inference — both the categorical and the hypothetical — in Jainism.
That inference is considered as a categorical syllogism is evident from the definition: “Inference is that knowledge which determines the major term (sādhya-niscayaka) through a mark (linga) - the middle term — which is invariably connected with the major term."2 A simpler definition is also found : “Inference is the knowledge of the major term (sādhya) by means of the middle term (sādhana).”3
That inference is considered as a hypothetical syllogism is evident from the definition: “Inference is the knowledge of pervasion (vyāptijñānaṁ) based on the presence or absence (of one thing in relation to another), and takes the form : 'If this is, that is ; If that is not, this is not; as for example, If there is smoke there is fire, If there is no fire, there is no smoke."4
Subjective inference consists in the knowledge of the probandum from the probans ascertained by one's own self, as having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. The term necessary concomitance signifies that in the absence of the one the other also will be absent. The definite cognition of the probans by the individual himself together with his previous knowledge of the invariable concomitance of the probans and the probandum gives him new knowledge and this is subjective inference.
Syllogistic inference comes under parārthänumāna. “Syllogistic
1 Nyāyāvatāra, 10-13 2 Ibid., 5 3 Parikşāmukha-Sūtra, III. 9 4 Ibid., 7-8 5 See M. L. Mehta, Outlines of Jaina Philosophy, pp. 108-109