Outlines of Jainism

Author(s): S Gopalan
Publisher: Wiley Eastern Private Limited New Delhi

Page 98

MIND
89
The distinctions drawn above between the sense organs and mind have been clearly referred to in the Tattvārtha-Sūtraand the Tattvārtha-Sūtra bhāşya.3 Vidyānanda maintains that the reason for considering the mind as unique is the obvious fact that the mind is different from the sense organs. He argues that if mind is regarded as a sense organ because of its instrumentality in getting knowledge even smoke which serves as an instrument of cognition by helping the inferential process should be considered a sense organ.4 In effect the argument signifies that considering the mind as a sense organ is as absurd as considering the middle term in a syllogistic inference as a sense organ. On the weakness of the argument M.L. Mehta writes: "This argument of Vidyānanda can only refute the position of a psychologist who regards mind as an ordinary sense organ. In the case of smoke the situation is different, since it is not an instrument of the self, being an object of cognition. A sense organ must be an instrument of the self, since the self is the agent that cognizes. Smoke is an ordinary object that can be perceived by the external senses. Hence the status of mind is not like that of an ordinary external sense organ, nor can it be regarded as an object of the senses like smoke. It is the internal instrument that helps the self in cognizing internal states like pleasure, pain, etc.'5
The most consistent definition of mind is given by Hemacandra who defines mind as the organ of cognition of all objects of all the senses. If the definition were simply that the mind is the one which cognizes all objects, it would not have differentiated the mind from the self since the latter also cognizes all objects. The difference precisely is that the one is dependent on the help of the sense organs whereas the other is not.? The Viseșāvasyaka-bhäşya similarly defines manas in terms of mental processes. The Nandi-Sūtra describes mind as that which grasps everything (sarvārtha grahaņam manaḥ).
2 Tattyārtha-Sūtra, II. 15 3 Tattvārtha-Sütra bhāşya, I. 14 4 Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, II. 15 5 Jaina Psychology, p. 69 6 Pramāņa-mīmāṁsa, I. 1. 24 7 Ibid., Comm. 8 Višeşävaśyaka-bhāşya, 3525 9 It is interesting to notice that such an analysis of the mind-defining it in