Outlines of Jainism

Author(s): S Gopalan
Publisher: Wiley Eastern Private Limited New Delhi

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JAINISM
cannot be maintained that one is expressible and the other, not. For, in the one case expression is through words and, in the other, expression is through gestures.
The second view that mati and śruta are not distinguishable from each other is held on purely logical grounds. It is said that language does not play the determining role in mati and that previous knowledge is of minor consequence to mati. But śruta is said to be very much associated with words. Since every form of perception is a potential form of śruta it has to be maintained that perception is associated with words but free from previous knowledge. This seems to be an impossibility and hence there is no real distinction between mati and śruta. To ward off the difficulty it is suggested by the defendants of the theory of distinction that when words are absent we have mati and association with words transforms mati into śruta. But the critics point out that this line of demarcation is too superficial and therefore it cannot be accepted that verbal expression accords new status to knowledge. It means simply that mati alone is sufficient and śruta is superfluous. Or it may be that śruta itself is a case of mati. In that case there is no justification for treating śruta separately, giving it a separate "category.' Sruta and mati must therefore be identical.