Outlines of Jainism

Author(s): S Gopalan
Publisher: Wiley Eastern Private Limited New Delhi

Page 66

DARSANA AND JNANA
hension and Comprehension are considered to occur simultaneously, omniscience itself would be conditional and not unconditional, a position which is just opposed to the spirit of the Jaina conception of kevala-jñāna.
(2) The second view puts forward a logical argument against the first. "If perfect apprehension and perfect comprehension were to occur simultaneously, what is the point in recognizing two separate veils of karma,-the apprehension-veiling and comprehensionveiling?" The view also points to the psychological impossibility of two things being comprehended simultaneously. These difficulties are got over by maintaining that apprehension and comprehension can occur only one after another. This view seems to account for advancement in general-whether in knowledge or in ethical life. The earlier stage is necessarily transcended in the later. Epistemologically, the advanced stage in knowledge connotes the earlier elementary stage having been completed. Ethically-and more specifically in terms of the 'veils of karma',-advancement entails the various veils being removed one after the other when, finally, all the veils are removed and perfection is attained.
(3) The third view refers to the fact that in the perfected man the senses and the mind do not serve any useful purpose. This means there is no separate faculty for apprehension. From this it is evident that in the perfected man, if at all we are to think of an apprehension and a comprehension, it can be only in terms of an identity between the two. It is understandable therefore that this view concedes the distinctness of apprehension and comprehension upto the level of manaḥparyāya-jñāna but not in kevala-jñāna.
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Reviewing the three alternatives it may be pointed out that there does not seem to be much difference between (1) and (3) inasmuch as they both are critical of (2). The view that two conscious activities cannot take place simultaneously is acceptable and it is interesting to note that both (2) and (3) point this out.
All the same the truth in the succession theory cannot be ignored since it points the way in which omniscience itself is to be analysed and understood. However, 'succession' in the omniscient himself seems to be a difficult point to concede. The identityconcept contained in the third theory is acceptable since in the omniscient simultaneous occurrence itself would mean occurrence of something not known before, and this amounts to admitting an element of ignorance in him.