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Paramarthika, including sensory perception into the first one and Avadhi, Manah-paryava and Kevala into the second, respectively. The four Āgamic divisions of Matijñāna-Avagraha (the cognition of an object as such without a further positing of the appropriate name, class, etc.); Iha (the thought process that is undertaken with a view to specifically ascertain the general object that has been grasped by Avagraha); Avaya (when further attentiveness to final ascertainment takes place regarding the particular feature grasped at the stage of lha) and Dharana (the constant stream of the ascertainment, the impression left behind it and the memory made possible by this impression, all these operations or the form of Matijñāna are called Dharana) were accepted as the classes of sensory perception. The indirect knowledge (Paroksa Jñāna) enumerated the cognition originated from mind (Manasajanya Jñāna) and Verbal testimony (Śrutajñāna) with a view that Inference (Anumana) etc. are the forms of Manasajanya Jñāna.
Thus, the attempt to synthesize the concept of Pramana with the theory of five-fold knowledge in the true sense begins from the period of Umasvati. Ācārya Umasvati maintains that these five types of cognition (knowledge) are five pramanas and divides these five cognitions into two Pramanas direct and indirect. Pt. Dalsukh Malvania has observed that the first attempt of this synthesis was made in Anuyogadvāra Sūtra, the only text accommodating Naiyayika's four-fold division of Pramana into knowledge. But this attempt not being in accordance with Jaina view, the later scholars tried to solve this problem and ultimately succeeded in doing so.
They discussed the concept of Pramanas on the base of five-fold knowledge of Jaina Āgamas, According to Nyaya-drsti;
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Jainism and its History
