Indian Antiquary Vol 59

Author(s): Richard Carnac Temple, Charles E A W Oldham, S Krishnaswami Aiyangar, Devadatta Ramkrishna Bhandarka
Publisher: Swati Publications

Page 160

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THE INDIAN ANTIQUARY
JULY, 19:30
seems to indicate that he was nearer in time to Dinnaga than to Dharmakirti. The verbal quotations that have bear noted in connection with the definition of the two framaras, pratyaksa and specially of dran prove beyond any doubt that he had direct acquaintance with Dinnaga's works, and that he was strictly dependent on them.
For all these reasons I think that the priority of Bhâmaha to Dharmakirti must be con. sidered as a well established fact, and not as a debatable hypothesis. His theories as a whole are essentially pre-Dharmakîrti and show but very little influence of the progress which took place in Nydya after the Pramanasamuccaya. Whatever the religious creed of Bhamaha might have been, there is no doubt that in his work we find a new proof of the great influence exercised by Dinnaga and his logic not only upon Buddhist thinkers, but upon Indian philosophy in general. Unfortunately we do not know very much about the philosophical and, more particularly, Nyaya literature of the time which separates Dinnaga from Dharmakirti. But from the scattered information at our disposal, we may gather that the theories of Dinnaga were largely discussed and developed. This is what we can deduce from the commentary of K'wei-chi upon the Nyaya praveša, which sheds much light upon the evolution of logical theories after Dinnaga and shows that many doctrines which appear now in the works of Dharmakîrti had been discussed and formulated before him. And it seems to me that not only Buddhist authors were taking an active part in these discussions, but that thinkers belonging to other currents also contributed to them. Difference of opinion was always possible as regards the metaphysical and ontological points of view, but as regards Nyaya, and chiefly pararthanumana, viz., syllogism and its laws, as applied to dialectical discussions on philosophical topics, there was a general agreement.19 Prasastapâda continues views that had been already elaborated by Buddhist Tarka-8dstras. Sankarasvåmin, whom we have no arguments either for identifying or not with the philosopher of the same name quoted by Kamalasila, cannot perhaps be considered, at least if we are to judge from his name, as a Buddhist. The Matharavrtti, as I hope to show in a forthcoming paper, expounds logical theories similar, and therefore chronologically near to those of Sankarasvamin, and so does the Jaina Pramananirnaya 30
Thus, we are confronted, it seems, with a general predominance of formal logic as elaborated by the Tarka-sástras and Dinnåga in his fundamental works, which influenced all the vada-sástras of t e time. This is a fact which is perhaps alluded to by Uddyotakara in his mangalácarana : kutarkikajananivritihetuh. Unfortunately, except the Nyâyapravesa. no other work of this kind has been preserved, though the names at least of some other great logicians have come down to us. One of these, for instance, is 1śvarasena, well known from Tibetan sources.31 He was the teacher of Dharmakîrti and he seems to have held particular views as regards the interpretation of Dinnaga's works, which were not accepted by his great disciple. But his works are lost : only some few fragments have come down to us.
Quotations from Isvarasena are, in fact, to be found in the following Sanskrit texts :(1) Fragment of a Buddhist Nyâya-sástra, preserved in the library of the Asiatic
Society of Bengal. The references to Isvarasena have been given by MM. Haraprasåda Sastri as follows :
(a) na tu yathesvaraseno manyata upalabdhyabhavamdtram anupalabdhir iti (6) [u]palabdhyabhavamdtram anupalabdhim abhavasya prasahya (corr. prasajya-]
pratisedhâtmanah prama intaratvena gamikám icchanti lóvarasena prabhrtayaḥ. 19 Practically no rosult is possible in dialectical debates if the opponents do not agree about the fundamental laws of the discussion itself.
30 We must remember, in fact, that the logical classifications of Nydyapravek ere identical neither with Dirinaga's theories, nor with Dharmakirti's. We must, therefore, deduce that they represent a particular moment in the evolution of logic between Diinägs and Dharmakirti.
21 TÅrånátha, History of Buldhism, transl. by Schief ner, pp. 159, 176. 29 Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit MSS. of the Asiatic Tociety of Bengal, vol. I, Buddhist M88., p. 31,