Indian Antiquary Vol 59

Author(s): Richard Carnac Temple, Charles E A W Oldham, S Krishnaswami Aiyangar, Devadatta Ramkrishna Bhandarka
Publisher: Swati Publications

Page 189

SEPTEMBER, 1930)
SAMKARA ON THE CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE
173
SAMKARA ON THE CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.
BY SATINDRA KUMAR MUKHERJEE, M.A. THE epistemological conditions of knowledge, according to Samkara, may be said to te two in number, viz., Permanence of the Subject, and Self-consciousness of the Subject. Wo shall treat them separately.
A, Permanence of the Subject. The world of our knowledge is a system in which every stray piece of knowledge takes its rightful place. Each piece of knowledge is connected with a number of its kind either by similarity or by contrast, and the fact that assimilation is necessary for the development of knowledge points to the same direction. Memory (smrti) and recognition (pratycvijña) based on it, show us in our practical life how much the elements of our knowledge are connected among themselves. When on seeing the face of a boy similar to that of my dead brother, I remember, with a mingling of pleasure and sorrow, the face of my dear brother who is no more, nay even every childish prattling and naughty trick of his, it shows that the elements of our knowledge are intimately connected. So, again, when we find a child, who has seen & snake for the second time, recognizes it to be snake similar to the one he had previously seen and with a terror-stricken face runs away from it, we can assert that the elements of his knowledge are interrelated. But how is such a complex net of interrelated elements of knowledge possible ?-Our memory, and recognition, which depends upon memory, show that the relation which the different elements have with one another is always through one single focussing point. 'I who saw that before remember that now,' 'I who saw that before recognize one similar to that now '-such are the forms of our remembrance and recognition. The elements of our knowledge are, indeed, in a process of continual change-A follows B, B follows C, and C in its turn is succeeded by D, and so on. But when we remember A or recognize B, our memory is always in the form 'I who saw A before remember A now,' or 'I who saw B beforo recognize B now.' We remember and recognize things of long past, and between our perception and remembrance or recognition a long time has elapsed, every moment of which had its own quota of knowledge. But still how is it that we remember or recognize? We can answer by saying that this is possible because they are the experienoes of a permanent individual, who is present throughout the confound. ingly numerous stray experiences. The experiences are of this permanent individual and through him they get their interconnection. It is easy to say, as Vasubandhu has done in his Abhidharmakoņa in reply to a question of Vatsiputriya as to how memory is possible without a permanent soul, that "In the current of phenomena which is designated by the name Caitra, a recollection appears. We notice the fact, and express it. It is no more." If asked to account for this appearance of a recolleotion, Vasubandhu will reply, as any modern sensationalist does, by appealing to the law of association. "There is a certain affinity (between ideas)," says he," there are ideas somehow similar to others and having a power of evoking them." Accepting that memory (and recognition also depending on memory) is due to association of ideas, the question remains as to how the permanent element of 'I' as found in memory is to be explained-'I remember this ' means, as already said, 'I saw that previously and I remember now.' Had there been no permanent (sthdy), 'I,' of whom all these are experiences, how can we explain the persistence of the 'IT' Had there been no permanent 'I,' who is different from all the experiences, the form of remembrance and recognition would have been- Another person saw this previously and I remember (or recognize) this now.' Samkara states in his Satra-bhagya, "Remembrance is possible only in the case that the perceiving and remembering agents are the same, for we find that the observations of one man are not remembered by another. How could there be an experience of the form 'I saw that thing and remember it now,' unless the seeing and remembering 1 Abhidhar naloga, Eng. Trans. by Prof. Stcherbataky, ch. VII, § 13.
Ibid., $15.