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Buddhist Philosophy
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as expressed in the Pali works. The Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrantikas have been more or less associated with each other. Thus the Abhidharmakosaśästra of Vasubandhu who was a Vaibhāṣika was commented upon by Yasomitra who was a Sautrāntika. The difference between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas that attracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former believed that external objects were directly perceived, whereas the latter believed that the existence of the external objects could only be inferred from our diversified knowledge'. Gunaratna (fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentary Tarkarahasyadipika on Saddarśanasamuccaya says that the Vaibhāṣika was but another name of the Aryasammitiya school. According to Gunaratna the Vaibhāṣikas held that things existed for four moments, the moment of production, the moment of existence, the moment of decay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed out in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa that the Vaibhāṣikas believed these to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination with the permanent essence of an entity produced its impermanent manifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation of Yasomitra on Abhidharmakośa kārikā, v. 25). The self called pudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was formless and was produced along with its object by the very same conditions (arthasahabhāsī ekasamāgryadhinaḥ). The Sautrantikas according to Gunaratna held that there was no soul but only the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past, the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, ākāśa and pudgala are but names (samjñāmātram), mere assertions (pratijñāmātram), mere limitations (samvṛtamātram) and mere phenomena (vyavahāramātram). By pudgala they meant that which other people called eternal and all-pervasive soul. External objects are never directly perceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining the diversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all compounded things are momentary (kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasamskārāḥ).
1 Madhavacārya's Sarvadarsanasamgraha, chapter 11. Sastradipika, the discussions on Pratyakṣa, Amalananda's commentary (on Bhamati) Vedantakalpataru, p. 286, 66 vaibhāṣikasya bahyo'rthaḥ pratyakṣaḥ, sautrāntikasya jñānagatākāravaicitryeṇ anumeyaḥ." The nature of the inference of the Sautrāntikas is shown thus by Amalananda (1247-1260 A.D.) "ye yasmin satyapi kādacitkāḥ te tadatiriktāpekṣaḥ" (those (i.e. cognitions) which in spite of certain unvaried conditions are of unaccounted diversity must depend on other things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects) Vedantakalpataru, p. 289.
