________________
I ADHYAYA, I PÂDA.
founded on the non-apprehension of the difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is superimposed1. Others2, again, define it as the fictitious assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which something else is superimposed. But all these definitions agree in so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing. And therewith agrees also the popular view which is exemplified by expressions such as the following: 'Mother-of-pearl appears like silver,' 'The moon although one only appears as if she were double.' But how is it possible that on the interior Self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed objects and their attributes? For every one superimposes an object only on such other objects as are placed before him (i.e. in contact with his sense-organs), and you have said before that the interior Self which is entirely disconnected from the idea of the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never an object. It is not, we reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion of the Ego3, and the interior Self is well known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive) presentation. Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects
5
is superimposed on the external thing mother-of-pearl and thus itself appears external. Both views fall under the above definition. 1 This is the definition of the akhyâtivâdins.
2 Some anyathâkhyâtivâdins and the Mâdhyamikas according to Ânanda Giri.
> The pratyagâtman is in reality non-object, for it is svayamprakâsa, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of Nescience, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross bodies, i. e. in so far as it is giva, individual or personal soul. Cp. Bhâmatî, pp. 22, 23: 'kidâtmaiva svayamprakâso-p i buddhyâdivishayavikkhuranât kathamkid asmatpratyayavishayo hamkârâspadam giva iti ka gantur iti ka kshetraga iti kâkhyâyate.'
• Translated according to the Bhâmatî. We deny, the objector says, the possibility of adhyâsa in the case of the Self, not on the ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it
Digitized by Google
