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II Adhyâya, 2 PÂDA, 2.
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antecedents; for they also are limited 2-Further 3, it is impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence presides.
2. And on account of the impossibility of) activity.
Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by which it is produced.— The three gunas, passing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of particular effects.-Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a non-intelligent pradhâna left to itself, as no such activity is seen in clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe that clay and the like, and chariots—which are in their own nature nonintelligent-enter on activities tending towards particular effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c. in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible.
But, the Sânkhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the part of mere intelligent beings.—True ; we however see activity on the part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they are in conjunction with intelligent beings.-But, the Sankhya again objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an intel
Samsargapūrvakarvaprasanga iti gunanam samsrishtânekavastuprakritikatvaprasaktir ity arthah. An. Gi.
• For they limit one another.
• To proceed to the argument from the separateness of cause and effect' (Sâ. Kâ. 15).
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