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II ADHYAYA, 2 PÂDA, 23.
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alternative is likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence), since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence. And in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues to exist without any interruption. For these reasons the two kinds of cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.
23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.
The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto, must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the 'path'. As therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine must be declared unsatisfactory.
exist, since the Bauddhas define the sattâ of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp. Sarvadarsanasamgraha). And the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.
1 Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground.- Analogously we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some form.
• The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.
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