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VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, &c.1 The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be demonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).-He2, moreover, who merely on the ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above ('He became knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction of intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i. e. the Sânkhya), would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world.
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If, then, on account of difference of character that which is intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also which is non-intelligent (i. e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhâna of the Sânkhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent.-(So much for argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.
1Ânanda Giri on the above passage: srutyâkânkshitam tarkam eva mananavidhivishayam udâharati svapnânteti. Svapnagâgaritayor mithovyabhikârâd âtmanah svabhâvatas tadvattvâbhâvâd avasthâdvayena tasya svato sampriktatvam ato gîvasyavasthâvatvena nâbrahmatvam ity arthah. Tathâpi dehâditâdâtmyenâtmano bhâvân na nihprapaйkabrahmatety âsankyâha samprasâde keti. Satâ somya tadâ sampanno bhavatîti sruteh sushupte nihprapaīkasadâtmatvâvagamâd âtmanas tathâvidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity arthah. Dvaitagrâhipratyakshâdivirodhât katham âtmano dvitîyabrahmatvam ity âsankya taggatvâdihetunâ brahmâtiriktavastvabhâvasiddher adhyakshâdînâm atatvâvedakaprâmânyâd avirodhâd yuktam âtmano dvitîyabrahmatvam ity âha prapazkasyeti.
Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a vailakshanya of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world.
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