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Parinama in Tarka-period
pted) there will not be (in the Alokākasa) either independent utpada-vyaya (i.e. due to its inherent agency), or even dependent (or relative) utpāda-vyaya (i.e. due to the agency of extraneous things). Consequently, the definition of Sat will become narrow (in so far as it will exclude Alokakāśa from its pale).
Thus, Siddhasena completes the application of Pariņāma, by extending it to Alokākāśa too.
It may be noted that in the SVM of Mallişeņa, the application of Pariņāma i.e. utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya, to Ākaša is explained, in two ways, as follows :
When souls and material objects, which occupy space, travel from one point of space, to another, they become separated from one portion of Akasa, and get united with another portion of Ākāśa. These separation and union, being contradictory dharmas, must belong to two different dharmins, according to the rule, (6377 f t Wegaf afgTAFETTA: Tutaxafa l i.e. those things must be regarded as distinct, which possess contradictory predicates, or spring from different causes. Akasa comes under the first part of the rule, and is thus shown to be two - one that is destroyed, and the other that is produced, the former being the one from which the previous samyoga is destroyed, and the latter being the one with which a new samyoga is produced; and yet, in another way, both the Ākāśas are one. Thus Akaga may be. shown to be both nitya and anitya.
When ‘ghața' is gone and 'pata' takes its place, 'ghatākāśa' is replaced by 'pațākāśa'; thus one Ākāśa is destroyed and another is produced. It may be objected, that this is mere `upacara' j.e. Ākāśa is not really produced or destroyed, but by a transference of predicates, it is said to be produced or destroyed according to the production or destruction of ghața, pața, etc., which condition it. To this objection, it is replied : the transference of predicates takes place in an ‘upacāra' owing to something being
