________________
The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Pariņāma
all its work will be finished in the first instant of time, leaving the thing without kriya and, therefore, different from what it was before, which amounts to a confession that the thing is anitya.
#58
In the same way, if all things be momentary, the cause and effect will fall on two different moments of time, and so, at the moment when one is, the other is not. Now how can that which is, act upon that which is not? And if a thing cannot act, it cannot be, for to be is to act or accomplish. Thus the things, can never be momentary in the absolute sense. This is, further, shown by the following dilemma: Is the momentary thing sat, while it acts, or is it asat? Not the former. For, in that case, it would be operating upon its contemporaneous effect which is impossible; for if that were possible, all things being contemporaneous with one another, would be causes of one another, which is absurd. The latter alternative also will not do, for how can a thing, that is asat, possess causal power any more than the hare's horn? And no third alternative is possible. Therefore the original hypothesis of momentariness breaks down17
For the Jain, however, there is no difficulty as the things, under syādvāda hypothesis, can act, while they possess the threefold charactieristic of abandonment of previous form, acceptance of a new form, and retention of its own identity.
(c) Pratyabhijñā Smaraṇa
In an absolutely unchanging thing, there being no antecedence and sequence, recognition of the sameness in change, is not possible; similarly recollection is impossible, on the assumption of momentariness of things. For, knowledge, that is, experience has passed away and there is nothing to connect it with the knowledge that is memory. If the author of experience and that of memory were not required to be identical, A would experience a
47 SVM on 26
