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Parinama in Tarka-Period
159
thing and B would remember it. In other words, any man would remember any thing, irrespective of the need of previous experience. And if recollection is impossible, recognition becomes impossible too, as it involves recollection in addition to experi
ence. 4 $
(2) Defence of Parinama on ethical grounds
All the darasanas, excepting Cārvāka, believe in liberation as the final goal of life and consequently the possibility of achieving it through human behaviour. Now, the Jains try to prove that on the assuption of either absolute non-change or absolute change, all human behaviour becomes meaningless.
If Atman be regarded as absolutely nitya, the experience of happiness and unhappiness, which is a felt fact, will be rendered impossible. For, to be nitya means to be unchangeable and there cannot be experience of happiness and unhappiness one after another unless Atman could pass from one state to another. It will be possessed of either happiness or unhappiness for all time, if it be absolutely nitya. If it be urged that the Atman does not change, only its states change, it is asked, 'do the states remain separate from the Atman or are they one with the Atman?' In the former case, how could they be associated with Atman ? In the latter case, they are as good as not, and the difficulty of accounting for change, consistently with the absolute nityatva of Atman, remains the same.
Furthermore, punya and papa too are impossible on the hypothesis of absolute nityatva. For, the experience of happiness and unhappiness are brought about by punya and papa, which means that they should exercise a certain activity and this is impossible, if Atman is unchangingly eternal.
Next, bondage and liberation will be similarly inexplicable on the hypothesis of exclusive nityatva. Bondage is a kind of sam
48 SVM on 18 (P. 125)
