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Parinama in Tarka-Period
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thing, that did not exist before, and vināśa is the opposite of it i.e. the abhāva or destruction of that which existed. 'Dhrauvya', on the other hand, is devoid of both these traits viz. utapada and vinaśa. How can these be in an entity at a time."2
The objection is answered by the Jain by an appeal to experience, as also by having recourse to the anekanta dialectic thus:
The experience favours the view that things are multiform in character, and so, the only doctrine which tallies with experience and, therefore, with truth is that things are neither exclusively nitya, nor anitya, but are, in reality, both.
It is also averred that the statement of utpada, vyaya, and dhrauvya is made from two different standpoints viz., the Paryāya standpoint and the Dravya standpoint respectively. It, thus, refers to the two aspects of reality, the Dravya referring to the dhrauvya aspect, and Paryaya to the utpada-vyaya aspect; so, there remains no scope for the alleged inconsistency which would be justifiable, if the two opposite properties were predicated, in one and the same breath, of one and the same aspect. 53
Another objection concerns the relation of the triad of utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya, to the thing (reality) of which they are predicated. This objection is stated and answered by Vidyānanda in this ASS.55 As this portion of ASS has been very lucidly explained by Dr. S.Mookerjee in his Jain philosophy of non-Absolutism" (p. 74-76) we quote his words below.
52 अत्राप्यभिदधत्यन्ये विरुद्धं हि मिथस्त्रयम् । gaâânal Ħaeci meafa angfag 11 उत्पादोऽभूतभवनं विनाशस्तद्विपर्ययः ।
ध्रौव्यं चोभयशून्यं यदेकदैकत्र तत्कथम् ? ॥
53 SVS VII 10-14; RajV on V. 30 (p. 239)
54 cf. Raj V. on TSû V. 29. P. 239. Śl. V. p. 434. SVM, p. 133-136. 55 ASS p. 112-113 (on Ami 11.)
