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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Pariņāma
then the question is, whether the vāsanā is momentary or otherwise. If the former, there is no reason for its recognition. The only reason for its recognition is to supply the principle if permanence, which is lacking in the kṣaṇasamtati. If, it is nitya, it violates the doctrine of universal momentariness.
The third alternative of anubhayapaksa too is impossible. There must be either bheda or abheda between vāsanā and kşaņasamtati; because bheda and abheda are mutually exclusive, and if one is not, the other must be there. Besides if the relation is neither bheda nor abheda, it means it is unreal. According to all those who do not endorse the anekāntavāda of the Jains, a thing must be either bhinna or abhinna, a third alternative is not possible. It is, therefore, concluded by the Jain that the opponent must endorse the Jain doctrine of both bheda and abheda."
Thus the aforementioned metaphysical and ethical problems, as also uncontradicted verdict of experience necessitate, maintains the Jain, the recognition of the doctrine of Pariņāma, which represents the synthesis of the two extremes of absolute nityatva and absolute anityatva. It is the doctrine of identity-in-change, of unity-in-difference.
After having justified the doctrine of Pariņāma on metaphysical and ethical grounds, the Jain sets himself to the task of answering the arguments advanced against the doctrine of Pariņāma.
13) Jainas answer the objections raised by others
It has been contended, by the opponent, that there is inconsistency in the doctrine of Pariņāma, as it involves the attribution of opposite properties of 'permanence' and 'change to one and the same entity For, utpāda is the birth or origination of some
SI SVM P. 126-128
