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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama
mity, I have drawn upon those authors whose exposition is detailed and clear. Other references are quoted in foot-notes.
(1) Defence of Parināma on Metaphysical grounds
The metaphysical problems concern the operation of causality (kāryakāraṇabhava), arthakriyākāritva, recognition (pratyabhijñā), and memory. The Jain writers mainly show that all these three would not be possible if their Pariņāmavāda is not accepted.
(a) Kāryakāraṇabhāva :
If a thing is regarded as unchanging in an absolute sense, there would be no causation, as causation is possible in time and is therefore possible in that which is temporal. An unchanging eternal has no temporal character and so cannot be a cause. On the other hand, if a thing is supposed to be momentary, in an absolute sense, the question arises, as to whether the two momentary reals that are supposed to cause one the other are simultaneous or successive. If the former, one of them cannot produce the other, any more than the left horn can produce the right horn. If the latter, there can be no causal relation between them, in as much as one (i. e. the cause) has already passed away when the other (i. e. effect) springs into existence. And if the latter can come into existence even in the absence of the cause at the moment of its origin, there is no reason why it should not come into being at the other moments (even before the production of the effeet) when the cause is absent likewise, 6
The Jain, however, maintains that causation can easily fit in with his view of reality, as it fulfils the necessary condition of 46 AMi 37, 43; DhS 237-244; AYD 16, SVM on AYD 16
It must be noted that many more arguments on the basis of dialectical reasoning are set forth in the works noted above, to show the impossibility of causation on the assumption of absolute non-change or absolute changefulness, but we have noticed only the important ones. I have followed the same method in the following discussion also.
