Study of Tattvarthasutra with Bhasya

Author(s): Suzuko Ohira
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Sec. 3. TEXTUAL COMMENTARY
various schools. The Nyāyasūtra 4.1.25-40 then investigate various views on the nature of things, 'saryin-antiya'n-utpatti-vināša-dharmakatvāt (25)', 'sarvam nityam pañca-bhūtanityatvāt (29)', 'sarvam prihag-bhāva-laksana-prthaktvāt (34)', and 'sarvam-abhāvob hāvesy itaretarābhāva-siddheh (37), which represent the positions of the Ksanikavāda, Brahmnism, Sautrāntika-Vaibbasika and sūnyavāda respectively. The first two schools herein assume the nature of things to be anitya or nitya on the basis of utpatti-vināśıdharmakatva or pañc-bhūta-nityatva. The Vai seșikasūtra 1.2.18 (text of Candrānanda) refers to the nature of sat that it has no specific mark of its own, 'sal-lingāviseşādviseşa-lingabhāvāc-caiko bhāyah iti'.
The Āgamic authors posited problems from various points of inquiry. From the viewpoint of dravya, pudgala is ultimately conceived in terms of atoms, and from the view. point of bbāva it is understood in terms of its properties. The Bhagavati 14.4.511 discusses that an atom is everlasting from the standpoint of dravya, but everchanging from the aspect of bhāva, 'paramānu-paggale nam bhamte: kim sāsae asāsae ? goyamā: siya sāsae siya asāsae, se kena-ttheram bhamle: evam vuccai siya sāsae siya asā sae ? goyamā: davvatthayāe sasae, vanna -pajjavenim jāva phāsa-pajjivehim asāsae, se tena-tthenam jāva siya sāsae siyı asās.de. Neither the Ksan kuvā la's view of sarve-anityatva nor Brahmavāda's view of sarva-nityatva expressed in the Nyāyasūtra above are acceptable to the Jainas. Umāsvāti thus caught hold of the causes of anityatva upheld by the K$anika väda, i. e., utpatti-vināša, and the Brahmavāda's nilyatva which can be expressed in terms of dhrauvya and proposed the Jaina view of sat from the standpoint of dravya-cum-bhāva that existence can be simulatneously qualified by these three mutually differing characteria stics, which clearly distinguishes itself from the Vaisesika assertioa that the existence has no specific mark of its own. The idea of pariņāma-nityatā is already implied in the Uttaradhyayana 28.6 wherein the definition of and the relation held among dravyaguņi-paryāya are expressed, 'guraram-asao davvam, ega-darva-ssiya guna / lakkhanam pajjavāņam tu, ubhao assiyā bhave.' And in this very context of the Nyāyasūtra discussion of the nature of things, Umāsváti proposed the Jaina view of nityatva to be paripāma-nityatā in the sūtra 30, that is, the state of the existence in these three forms is everlasting. The concept of sat-nityatva was thus grasped and expressed by Umāsvati primarily in the context of pudgala.
Then the aphorism 31 proposes arpita-anarpita theory to be the reasoning ground of the concepts expressed in the previous two aphorisms. The Bhāşya says that threefold natures of sat and the twofold natures of nitya, the latter of which remains without explanation, are established by the viewpoints of arpitavyāvahärika and anarpitavyāvahārika. It then shows how these viewpoints are to be applied to four kinds of sat as follows:
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