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114 :: Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism
of knowledge can be broken at any stage in the history of the soul's life, nor does the Jaina theory of attributes permits such a conception. On the same ground the flow of conation must also be held to be continuous. Thus the problem of successive occurrence of conation and knowledge does not at all arise. Then the conception of their successive occurrence, in the mundane souls, must yield such a meaning as would not imply the breach of their flows. It appears that the Jaina writers are making their statement from the object-point of view. It means that conation and knowledge both cannot be directed towards the same object. Once the conation has given a start to the process of knowledge, it becomes unintelligible that it persists in the same form throughout the process of knowledge. But at the same time the function pertaining to conation cannot be suspended. It would mean that in the mundane souls conation and knowledge find their direction to different objects. The contention that two conscious activities cannot take place simultaneously has already been meted out. Modern psychology also holds that no psychosis is purely conative, cognitive or affective; it can, at most, show a dominance of one or the other aspect. Mc Dougall remarks: “But it is generally admitted that all mental activity has these three aspects, cognitive, conative and affective; and when we apply one of these three adjectives to any phase of mental process, we mean merely that the aspect named is the most prominent of the three at that moment.'1 A psychosis according to the Taina philosophy of the soul, is a collective mode of the soul based on a number of aitributes. Hence it must show a comprehence of conation, cognition and affection. Cognition and affection with respect to an abject must coexist; but cognition of an object and cognition of a feeling with respect to the object cannot coexist, because they are the modes of the same attribute. So also we must distinguish between conation and knowledge of conation, the latter belongs to the series of knowledge. Considered
1. Mc Dougall: An Outline of Psychology, p. 266
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