________________
The Soul and Consciousness :: 135
The first of the three components of the argument for omniscience has already been established in the previous chapter. The remaining two components are concerned with the relation of the soul with the karmic forces—a topic to be discussed later on under karma phenomenology. (See chapter 8). Here, we simply accept the truth of this relation as granted. Perfect knowledge is not something thrust from without into the nature of soul; but it is the pure function of the soul with respect to the knowledge-attribute. This brings us to the Cartesian theory of innate ideas which means that the soul must be imbued with all forms of cognitions. "What the real object is, what it is when stripped of the qualities the senses ascribe to it, we can know only by clear and distinct thinking. If we cannot derive true knowledge from sense experience, if genuine knowledge is the result of certain basal notions and principles, these must be inherent in the mind itself, innate, or a priori.'1 Jainism may be said to believe in the theory of innate ideas but such ideas, being modes of an attribute, are contained in the soul only potentially. There are no ready made ideas stored up in the constitution of the soul. When the soul is left to itself, its function becomes self-determined; and ideas concerning all the objects emerge in it. This conclusion is based on the truth that the nature of an entity is never detrimental to its identity. Considered subjectively the kevalajñāna or the perfect knowledge represents the purest form of knowledge. The term kevala implies independence from all sorts of aids.... Thus kevalajñāna is distinct from all those types of knowledge which are determined by the destructionsubsidence of the karmas. The idea implied is that perfect knowledge, in its identity, is not identical with clairvoyance and telepathy. Considered objectively, the kevalajñāna has been said to be embracing all the substances and their modes. H. Joachim thinks: 'Omniscience, we may admit,
1. Thilly: A History of Philosophy, p. 259 2. Akalanka: Rājavārtika, 1.9.7 3. Umāsvāti: Tattvārthasūtra, 1. 29.
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
