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160 :: Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism
conation and knowledge are forms of bliss, while others are cognitive and conative. As a mode of the same attribute conation and bliss or cognition and bliss cannot be copresent. This will lead to the breach of the series of conations and cognitions-a position which is contradictory to the Jaina conception of reality. Hence to call bliss a mode of conation or cognition is not a tenable view. The other writers are not so clear as Śrutasāgara Sūri in this respect. Hence the only alternative left is that bliss may be admitted as a trait of the manifestaions of the knowledge attribute. We have already shown that there is a distinction between feeling and cognition. Moreover the disproportionate co-existence of bliss and knowledge suggests that bliss and knowledge are not determined by the same faculty of the soul. It seems reasonable that a distinct faculty must be postulated to determine the affective manifestations of the soul. The author of the Pañcādhyāyi expresses his view as 'The nondistinction of pleasure and pain from knowledge is also not unproved, for pleasure and pain, being conscious, are not found elsewhere expect with knowledge."! Bliss and cognition may be looked upon as identical from some point of view, but their identity as a single attribute is not consistent. Rājamalla has once accepted the distinction between knowledge and bliss at the attributive level, so he cannot establish their identity at the same level. We have seen that consciousness is a general implication of the special attributes of the soul. Knowledge, conation, bliss all are conscious attributes and for this reason they cannot be held to be identical. Taking a synthetic view of the self not only bliss is identical with knowledge as held by Akalanka, Amrtacandra and Jayasena, or it is identical with knowledge and conation both as held by Śrutasāgara Sūri; but all of them can be held identical with one another and ultimately forming one unity wherein these attributes can be distinguished. The Jaina, being a non-absolute thinker, will easily accommodate all these views, but he has to assign
1. Räjamalla: Pañcădhyāyi, II, verse 14
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