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Chapter 7 Plurality of Souls
Statement of the Problem
The problem of plurality of souls may be considered in its two aspects. Just as the truth of consciousness on its functional side is not disputed, so also the truth of plurality of souls on the functional side should not be questioned. No two persons feel as one. Not only the physiological structures of two persons are seen distinct, but also their mental structures repel each other. Plurality of souls or centres of conciousness like consciousness itself, is a fact of our experience. Every system of philosophy has to accommodate and explain the concept of the plurality of souls. Lord Haldane rightly remarks: "The self that knows is distinguished from other selves by the details of experience, by its own peculiar surroundings, by its history, by contents stored in memory, of which it is aware if they are reflected on and so made an object for its thinking.... What is it that makes me and my friend and animals separate animals? It is our own separate organism and their histories and their individual experience." The Jaina is of opinion that the souls are not only functionally distinct, but they are so structurally as well. In other words, for the Jaina, the substance of one soul is not identical with that of any other soul. It is mainly on the basis of the individual experience that the individuality of the souls is admitted.
1. Haldane: Reign of Relativity, p. 151
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