Book Title: Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism
Author(s): S C Jain
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith

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Page 248
________________ 244 :: Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism The Śūnya or the Bhūtatathātā of Buddhistic Philosophy Buddha's silence on the problem of the nature of reality has been generally taken to imply two things. Firstly, Buddha kept silent, because there are no contents in reality which may be described. It means that the indescribability of reality is due to a total absence of features in it. Secondly, Buddha kept silent because the nature of reality is not at all touched by words. The first view leads to featurelessness of reality, while the second negates its describability. The common conclusion from both the implications is that reality is absolutely indescribable. As regards the first view Samantabhadra says: “If the indescribable means something devoid of all features, then it is non-reality." This position reduces itself to the theory of pure being which we have seen to be untenable. As a matter of fact even being cannot be attributed to such a principle, because it is also a feature. T.R.V. Murti states that for the Mādhyamika the partial comprehensions about reality are absolutely false, because they are ascriptions of features non-existent in reality. This again means a total negation of features in reality. So the descriptions of reality which we generally make may be held to be true only from the empirical viewpoint (samurti). At the same time this samurti is absolutely false because it ascribes to reality something which is totally non-existent in it. Hence our descriptions of reality are not at all faithful to it. If the sūnya is interpreted as a complete void, the problem of the falsity of samvrti also falls to the ground. So the sūnya has been taken to mean the indeterminate--which implies that reality is something positive but is no subject of comprehension based on reason. It is said that “the Madhyamika dialectic tries to remove the conflict inherent in Reason by rejecting both the opposites taken singly or in combination. The Mädhyamika is convinced that the conjunctive or disjunctive synthesis of the opposites is but another view.... The function of the 1. Samantabhadra: Āptamīmāṁsā, verse 48 2. T.R.V. Murti: The central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 240 Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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