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98 : Śramaņa, Vol 58, No. 1/January-March 2007
Mahopādhyāya Yaśovijaya brings about the compatibility of the usage of 'kevalāni” and jñānam' in plural number and singular number respectively as follows - “na pañcabhiḥ sambhūyaikam jñānamavagrahādicaturbhiriva bhavatīti sūcanāya kevalanti bahuvacanam, jñānamityatriakavacanam tu pratijñānurūpatvāt prativacanasya."15 The learned author of the sub-commentary entitled 'Gūdhārthadipika' on the 'Vivarana' of Mahopādhyāya Yašovijaya has presented an elaborate explanation of this portion taking recourse to the terse technical terms of Navya-nyāya. Removing the lacuna in the bhâsya on the sūtra in question, Mahopādhyāya Yaśovijaya has put forth specific definitions of the five cognitions precisely as follows!? :
1. Indriyānindriyavyāpārajanyam jñānam matijñānam 2. Sabdaśaktijanyam jñānam Śrutajñānam 3. Rūpimātravişayamavadhijñānam 4. Bhāvamanahparyāyamātrasākşătkari manaḥparyāyajñānam 5. Jñānäntarāsahacaritam sarvavişayam vā kevalajñānam
Explaining the sūtra 'tatpramāņe'18 he has rightly observed in support of the scholiast Umāsvāti that the state of organ of valid cognition (Pramāṇatva) and the number two both are enjoined in the sūtra. According to him, all other Pramāṇas accepted by the opponents are included under these two provided they are really organs of valid cognition. He further opines that of both the direct and indirect the ‘sākāra' cognition (determinate i.e. devoid of doubt and error etc.) alone deserves to be designated as Pramāņa. It is worth-mentioning here that in the exposition of the sūtra (1/10),18 he has also discussed the view of the Jaina philosophers who uphold all the cognitions as direct knowledge (Pratyakşa) because the word 'Akşa' (372) is commonly used for mind, sense-organs and soul. Herein the views regarding the conception of directness (Pratyakşatā) and indirectness (Parokşatā), too, have been discussed in detail.
