Karma Mimansa

Author(s): Berriedale Keith
Publisher: Berriedale Keith

Page 27

THE KARMA-MİMAMSA
between the two sets of instances can only be supplied by reference to an external factor, which is fatal to the belief in intrinsic validity or the reverse, Therefore, the Nyaya argues, it is best to accept the doctrine that apprehension or cognition is intrinsically unauthoritative, and its authoritativeness in any special case is derived from the perfection of the cause of the apprehension. This doctrine, it is pointed out, explains the case of dream consciousness; it is invalid. because there is no perfection in its cause, while the waking consciousness may be valid if it is due to a perfect source, if, however, the source is vitiated, when the sense organs are defective, the apprehension is doubtful or erroneous, while in the case of non-apprehension there is no defect in the cause, but absence of cause.
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The reply of Kumarila is that, if apprehension were not in itself valid, it could not be made so by any external power Apprehension needs, indeed, an originating cause, but it does not depend on any external cause for its power of ascertaining the true nature of things. The conclusive argument is that, if the validity of a cognition is deemed dependent on the perfection of its source, then there must be another cognition to guarantee the correctness of the source, and so ad infinitum, and such a process is illegitimate, at least in the eyes of Kumarila, who does not appreciate the possibility of regarding truth as a complete system, in which all parts are dependent on one another, and there is no simple primary truth. All cases of apprehension, therefore, are prima facie valid, and, if cognitions are erroneous doubtful, that is, due to defects in their causes, while nonapprehension is due to the absence of any cause, as on the Nyaya theory, with which Kumarila agrees in this regard.
or
The recognition of the non-validity of an apprehension establishes itself most simply when a subsequent cognition sublates an earlier cognition, for instance, when the erroneous judgment, "This is silver," is supplanted by the correct judgment, "This is mother-of-pearl." More indirectly the former judgment can be sublated by another judgment, based on the recognition of the defect of the cause, thus the proposition, "The shell is yellow," thay be sublated by the further judgment, "The eye is jaundiced "