Karma Mimansa

Author(s): Berriedale Keith
Publisher: Berriedale Keith

Page 50

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
41
word possessed as many potencies of denotation as there were individuals, and, as all the individuals could never be known, the word would never fully be coniprchended, Nor could the word denote an aggregate of individuals since all individuals cannot be known, and therefore an aggregate could not be known, while, even if it could be known, as its constituent parts would be ever perishing or replaced, the signification of the word would be a constant flux. Finally, if the word meant a single individual only, there could be no eternal connection between word and ineaning, and, in the absence of any means of discovering which individual was meant, action would be impossible, The difficulty regarding sacrificial operations in regard to a class instead of an individual, is disposed of by pointing out that such actions must be performed by substances, and that the injunctions specify, not the individual substance to be used in any special casc, but the class of sub. stance, individual portions of which are applied by each sacrificer,
As regards the authority attaching to words there is a sharp distinction between the older school, followed by Prabhakara and Kumárila. Prabhākara holds that the only authoritative testimony to things beyond the reach of the senses and other means of proof is the scripture (Šāstra). Other words deal only with matters cognised by perception, inference, etc., and have no inherent cogency; if they give us true information, it is merely because we believe the speaker to be trustworthy. Thus, like the Vaišeşika school, Prabhakara holds all cognition of this kind to be based on inference, the argument being, “This man says something : he must know what he is talking about ; what he says, therefore, must be true." From another point of view, human words are of no higher value than remembrance, which is admittedly no source of valid universal judgments. Thus the sole possibility of the validity of verbal testimony lies in the Veda, which has no author, and therefore is not vitiated by the doubts as to trustworthiness and ability of correct expression, which precludes us from
? Cf. Nyayamañjari, pp. 152 ff.