Karma Mimansa

Author(s): Berriedale Keith
Publisher: Berriedale Keith

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THE KARMA-MIMAMSA
speculation, which holds that the form of the object is impressed on the cognition. The objection to the NyāyaVaisesıka view appears to be that the idea is understood by the school to be perceived simultaneously with the object, and, as the perception of the idea requires that it should be provided with visible form, that is, colour and extension, there would be no possibility of demonstrating the existence of the external object, since, the forma being cognised with the idea, an external reference would be needless. The objection, it must be noted, is not cogent against the developed forın of the Nvāya doctrine, in which it is held that on the actual cognition (vyavasāya) there supervenes the mental perception of the cognition (anuvyavasāya); the cognition thus brings reality immediately before the mind, while in a secondary act the cognition itself is made the object of introspection, as in the accepted theory of neiern psychology, The Mimărsă, by ignoring this possible view, renders it necessary to hold that a cognition can never be the object of introspection, it is an entity which is inferred from the fact of cognition; its existence is known, but not as an object of sense-perception of any kind. Mental perception, which the school admits, is thus restricted to those forms of mental activity which are not cognitive.
There remains, however, yet another contention of the Sünyavāda which Kumārila seeks to refute. It is based on the view that atoms are invisible, that aggregates of atoms are invisible, that all objects, being composed of such aggregates, are invisible and incomprehensible, and therefore void. The weight of this argument lies in the fact that the Mināmsā gives a more or less hearty acceptance to the doctrine of atons, though Kumārila is careful not to bind himself definitively to it. The conglomeration of atoms, it is urged, is impossible, since atoms have no extension, or at any rate no parts, and no contact between then is, therefore, conceivable More generally, it is also contended that no whole of parts can really exist. If it did, it must either reside in its entirety in each of the component parts, which is positively absurd, or it must reside collectively in all the parts; in this event, even if it can be assumed that it is something over and above the parts, it would be perceived only when all the parts had