Karma Mimansa

Author(s): Berriedale Keith
Publisher: Berriedale Keith

Page 94

RULES OF RITUAL INTERPRETATION 85
kara or Kumārila (1, 3, 10) from agreeing that, when the Veda uses a barbarous word, it is to be interpreted in the sense barbarian usage accords to it, in lieu of attempting to foist upon it an etymological sense.
The relation of Smrti authority to the Veda, in cases where there appears to be conflict, is the subject of divergence of opinion between Prabhākara and Kumārila. In the view of the former, which is apparently that of the Mmārsá Sutra (1,3,3-), if a Smrti contradicts a Vedic passage, the former loses all authority, while, even in the case of Smrti passages which do not thus offend, it may be impossible to accord their injunctions any spiritual value, if they seem to be due to the avarice of the priests, as when the giving of the cloth from the sacrificial post to a priest is enjoined by Smrti authority, Kumārila, however, *with his greater regard for tradition, reduces, as far as possible, cases of contradiction to mere instances where alternatives are permissible, and only holds that the Sutra recommends in the case of such alternatives the adoption of that which has direct, and not merely inferred, Vedic authority
Below the Smrtis in value comes the practice of good men (I, 3, 8-9) or custom (I, 3, 15-23) on the simple ground that, while both must go back to Vedic authority to be valid, the former goes more directly to the fountainhead In addition, however, to Smrti and practise must be reckoned as sources of knowledge of duty the implications contained in Vedic texts, which may be deduced by us from them, even if not already set out in Smrtis or by tradition.
The essential function of all these sources is to give us knowledge of injunctions (vidhi), and injunctions are encitements to actions. Actions may be classified in various ways, there is a clear distinction between Vedic and worldly actions, with the former alone is the Mimāńsã concerned. Actions of this type may be classed as positive, as negative pratişedha), or as partaking of both characters (paryudūsa), as in
: Kumărila enlivens the discussion by giving a long list of errors in grammnat conmitted even by grammarians, and similarly diversifies (1, 3, 7) his exposition of the practice of the good by an account of crimes attributed to gode and sages. On grammar, cf. Nyāyamañjari, pp. 412-26.