Karma Mimansa

Author(s): Berriedale Keith
Publisher: Berriedale Keith

Page 62

THE WORLD OF REALITY
33
tion, and mutual negation, sub-divisions which, of course, are simply transferred bodily from the Nyāya-Vaisesika doctrine Non-existence stands in definite opposition to the other four categories accepted by Kumārila; though regarded as real, at is nevertheless admitted to be essentially relative to the four categories of being (bhāva). Prabhākara, however, rejects non-existence, as might have been expected from his rejection of non-existence or non-apprehension as a means of proof. The only reality, in his view, in the absence of a pot from a spot of ground is the spot of ground. The particularity of the Nyāya-Vaiseşika, which serves to differentiate such thipgs as the ultimate atoms and selves, has no foundation as a separate category, as the differentiation can be based on the ordinary qualities which these things possess.
me Substance is that in which qualities reside, and Prabhākara reckons the number as nine: earth, water, air, fire, ether, the self or soul (ätman), mind, time, and space. Kumārıla is credited with admitting also the substantiality of dark ness and sound, while others accept gold as a twelfth. Of these earth, water, air and fire all possess colour and tangibility, and accordingly are the objects of the senses of sight and touch, but only when in non-atomic form, for some degree of magnitude is recognised by Prabhākara, as by the later Nyāya-Vaišeşika, as a necessary condition, along with touch (sparsa), of proper sense perception. The other five substances cannot be regarded as perceptible, since they cannot be seen or touched, and therefore are only in ferred to exist. In the case of ether the apparent whiteness of it is due to particles of fire in it, while the darkness of night is not a substance, nor is it a quality; if it were a quality it would be perceptible by day also, and therefore must be deemed to be merely absence of light. A variant of this doctrine in the school of Prabhākara declares darkness to be the absence of the knowledge of light. Kumārila claims darkness as a substance, because it is blue in colour and moves, these two facts being necessarily attributed to some
1 Prakarta pañcikī, pp. 24, 54, 77, 84, 141 ff; Mänameyodaya, pp. 6ff, 66 ff, 78 ff; Slokaväritika, p. 404 (v. 183); Tarkıkarakşa, Pp 133, 134,