Karma Mimansa

Author(s): Berriedale Keith
Publisher: Berriedale Keith

Page 52

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
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results from obeying its injunctions, are conclusive proofs of the eternity of the Veda, and the alternative view of a creator is needless and unsatisfactory both in regard to the Veda and to the world.
Other forms of proof, both Prabhākara and Kumārila expressly reject. Sambhava, which is variously interpreted as probability, e.g. that ten is included in fifty, or much more probably as inclusion pure and simple, is regarded as merely a form of inference. Rumour, which like Sambhava is claimed as a means of proof by the Paurāņikas, is patently useless for purposes of proof; its source being uncertain, it is quite impossible to afford its contents any measure of credit. Gesture (ceştā), which is given as a means of proof by the Tantra school, the Mimāmsā ignores.
The relation between the various means of proof is developed by Kumărila; the use of any means of proof such as inference is debarred if there is a more direct mode of cognition, e.g. sense perception, or if the contrary of what is sought to be established is established in advance by the use of some simpler means of proof.
1 Prakarana pañcikd, pp. 125, 126; Manameyodaya, pp. 64, 65, Slokavārttika, p. 492 (vv. 57, 58); Tarkıkaraksā, pp. 116, 117; Şaddarsanasameccaya, p. 207.