Karma Mimansa

Author(s): Berriedale Keith
Publisher: Berriedale Keith

Page 40

O
IH PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
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of the inference alone, thus permitting no further conclusion Earth, for example, has odour, but nothing further can be derived from this unique relationship. Agäilt the relation must be universally valid, a rule
her excludes the too general middle (sādhārana) It is impossible to prove that sound is eternal because it can be known, since many things can be known and yet are not eternal. The necessity of some relation existing excludes the variety of middle term known as annulled (bädhita); to prove sound eternal because it is a product is impossible, since the character of being a product is flatly inconsistent with eternity. Finally, the necessity, that the middle term should be perceived as the basis of the attribution of the major to the minor, excludes the variety of middle term known as unreal (a siddha); thus the perception by the Buddha of righteousness and unrighteousness on the ground of his omniscience is an illegitimate argument, since the omniscience of the Buddha has never been perceived. No other form of fallacy of the middle is accepted by Prabhākara ; he rejects the Nyāya view of the fallacy of the counter-balanced middle (sotpratipaksa), which balances against the argument, e.g. of the imperceptibility of air because of its lack of colour, the argument of its perceptibility because of its tangibility. Prabhākara's argument is that it is not possible for contradictory predicates, such as lack of colour and tangibility, are thus assumed to be, to exist in respect of one subject; hence one of the two alleged inferences is wholly invalid, and there is no true counterbalancing. He holds that really contradictory inferences are possible only of some subject whose nature is unknown, in which case, however, in the absence of the essential known relation, no true inference is attainable.
The views of Kumārila do not differ materially from those of Prabhākara ; he classifies the too restricted and the too general fallacies under the head of doubtful (anaikantika), and adds as a third class the case of conflicting inferences, which he accepts, contrary to the views of Prabhākara. Of the unreal (asiddha) and the contradictory types of fallacy he gives various sub-divisions. In