Karma Mimansa

Author(s): Berriedale Keith
Publisher: Berriedale Keith

Page 41

32
THE KARMA-MĪMĀMSÄ
this and in his elaborate examination of the generality (samanya), which lies at the basis of inference, he shows plainly his close relation to the Nyāya and his polemic against the Buddhist views. In accord with the older view accepted in Buddhist logic, Prabhākara recognises not merely fallacies of the ground (hetu), but also of the minor (paksa), the example (drstānta), and even of the proposition (pratijñā), which in the Nyāya view are all reduced to special cases of fallacies of the ground.
Analogy or comparison is accepted by both schools of Mimāṁsā with the Vrttikāra, but their view of the exact nature of this form of proof differs from that of the Nyaya generally, which accepts analogy as a distinct form of proof. In the Nyāya view the process results in the cognition that an object, hitherto unknown, when brought within the range of perception, is recognised, by reason of its similarity to something already known, to be the object designated by a name communicated by some person of experience. Thus a man who has never seen a buffalo in his life is informed by a forester that the buffalo is like the cow; on entering the waste he sees an animal similar in appearance to the cow, and formulates the judgment, "This thing is a buffalo." The precise force of the judgment is disputed in the school, but the best opinion is that it applies not merely to the single animal seen, but that the precipient acquires a correct apprehension of the specific nature of the whole class buffalo. Thus, as Udayana' says, the effect of this means of proof is to give a clear uaderstanding of the meaning of a word, though he rejects the view, held by Bhāsarvajñas and his followers in the Nyāya school, that analogy can be reduced to a particular instance of verbal testimony (sabda), as well as that of the Vaiseşika, which reduces analogy to inference. The Mīmārsā view of the analogical cognition is that it consists
v
17
1p . pily-r-gordeon's. pp. 110-12; Slokavārttjka, pp. 433 50, 1:12
- . 292, 293 "skusumangala, il, 8-12; '. !, !, Tārkikaraksē, pp. 84-93.
8 Nyāyasāra, pp. 30, 31. The Jain view (Şaddarsanasamuccaya, pp. 205, 206) reduces it to recognition, a form of Paroksi,