Karma Mimansa

Author(s): Berriedale Keith
Publisher: Berriedale Keith

Page 42

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
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in the recognition in an object not presented to the senses of similarity to an object which is actually perceived. Thus, in the instance taken above, the judgment arrived at is, " The cow which I saw in the city is similar to the animal' I now see in the forest." Both schools agree in this view, though Prabhākara regards siipilarity as constituting a distinct metaplıysical category, a position denied by the school of Kumārila, who treat it as a quality arising from the fact that more than one object possesses the same set of qualities. The separate character of analogy as a means of proof is deduced by distinguishing it from the other means which it resembles. Thus it is not perception, since the cow is not perceived at the time the judgment is formulated. it is not verbal testimony, for it involves only the perception of similarity; it is not inference, as the mental process is quite different; nor is it mere nemory, for the similarity is not remembered. The Nyāya view is declared erroneous; the assertion that the buffalo is like the cow cannot be assumed as a basis for the conclusion, since, as a mere liuman utterance, it may be untrustworthy; the cognition of the buffalo and its similarity to the cow is pure perception; the conclusion that the animal seen is what is denoted by the word "buffalo" is merely inference, so that, if the Nyaya view is adopted, there is no real independent form of proof called analogy (1pamany), or true analogical judgment (upamiti). While the polemnic against the Nyāya is not unsuccessful, the discussion makes it clear that there is no real separate sphere for analogy as a means of proof.
Unlike the Nyāya, both schools of Mimāınsă accept, with the Vrttikāra, presumption (arihüpatti) as a separate means of proof, But Prabhākara's analysis of this forn, of demonstration differs radically from that of Kumārila. Piesumption in his view arises when it is necessary to assume some fact in order to avoid inconsistency in respect of some thing which is actually perceived. Thus, if we know that a
1 For the buffalo"; the Mimiinst view sloes not recognise the previous information as to the likeness of the cow and buffalo.
* D[āmānsä Sitra, p. 10; Prnkarana pancikā, pp. 113 18, Slokavártlika, pp 450-72 ; Manumeyodaga, pp. 51-57; cf. Nytyamadım parz, pp. 36-48; Saddarśanzscmuccaya, pp. 293-95.