Karma Mimansa

Author(s): Berriedale Keith
Publisher: Berriedale Keith

Page 44

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
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with the Nyāya and Vaišesika, declines to accept nonapprehension as a distinct means of proof. When we say, "The jar is not on the ground,' all that we mean is that, if the jar were on the ground, we would perceive it there, but that as a matter of fact we see the ground alone. The seeing of the ground is mere perception, and the further statement is merely a qualification of what is perceived in terms of something which, formerly seen along with it, is not now present. In this there is no separate mental process leading to proof. The Nyava also escapes the difficulty by adopting a peculiar doctrine of its own, under which non-existence, regarded as a positive entity, is perceived by a peculiar mode of contact known as the relation of qualifier and qualified.
Whether, however, four, with Prabhākara, or, with the Vrttikāra and Kumārila, five means of proof other than verbal testimony or scripture are reckoned, all these means of proof are subject to the defect that they do not avail to determine the nature of Dharma, man's duty and righteousDess. This is established by the Sūtra (I, 1, 4) for the case of perception; that means of proof deals only with existing things which can be brought into contact with the organs of sense, but duty is a thing which is not already existing, but needs man's action to bring it to fruition, and duty is not tangible so as to be able to come into contact with the organs. Inference, analogy, presumption, and non-apprehension, all have relation to perception, and for that reason are vitiated by the defects of the latter, as sve gather from the Vrttikāra, who thus supplements Jaimini. On the other hand, Taimini declares that the relation of the word to its meaning is natural and eternal, and Vedic injunctions are, therefore, the source of knowledge of duty, which is something not open to ordinary means of apprehension. Such injunctions are authoritative, according to Bādarāyana as cited in the Mināmsä Sūtra, because of their independence. In die definition of the Vrttikāra? scriptural cognition (sästra) is the cognition of some thing, which is not percept
1 P. 10; Prakaranapariciki, pp. 87-110, 131-40, 161-70; fickavörttika, pp. 405-33, 498 ff, 728 ft; Mānaneyodaya, pp. 40.47 ; cf Nyayamañjarī, pp, 150 ff, 205 ff.