Karma Mimansa

Author(s): Berriedale Keith
Publisher: Berriedale Keith

Page 26

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
LIKE the Nyāya, the doctrine of Prabhākara and Kumārila accepts a distinction between Valid and invalid knowledge, but the basis of the distinction is different in the two cases, and the ground on which validity is asserted is also diverse. To the Mimāṁsā apprehension (anubhūti) is intrinsically valid, while remembrance (smrti) is intrinsically invalid, since it rests on a previous impression; the Nyāya equally disregards remembrance, but it does not accept the intrinsic validity of self-evidence (svatak pru.manya) of apprehension; apprehensions may be valid (oramā) or invalid (aprama), the proof being given ab extra. Remembrance both schools distinguish from recognition (pratyabhijñā), which is not regarded as depending solely on a previous mental impression, and therefore is exempt from the fatal defect of remembrance,
The intrinsic validity of apprehension is a cardinal doctrine of the Mimāṁsā and Kumārila' defends it at length against the obvious objections to which it is exposed. It is impossible, it is argued, for apprehension to possess the opposing characteristics of validity and non-validity as part of its nature; nor can the validity or non-validity of apprehension depend on the ascertainment of the perfection or defect of the cause of the apprehension, since this would imply that, prior to such ascertainment, apprehension was devoid of character of its own. To assume that some cases of apprebension are intrinsically valid, and other intrinsically invalid, is open to the objection that the criterion
Slokozarttika, I, 1, 2, v. 21 ff; $astrodipika, pp. 15, 31, Manameyodaya, pp. 1-4, 74-78, cf. Nyāyamañjari, pp. 160-89; Tarkkaraksā pp. 19 ff.