Jainism from the View Point of Vedantic Acaryas

Author(s): Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: B J Institute

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Sri Sankarācārya's views on Jainism
number, and have specific in character. Then, when we apply seven-fold judgement (Syādvāda) to these, there will be confusion about them. Such as, they may be just as they are described or they may not be. These categories described in Jainism, in reality, may not be so, or may be, as it is described. So, this kind of knowledge about the objects will be uncertain. All assertion about them will end in doubt and cannot give definite knowledge. It will certainly be unauthoritative like doubt. (ये एते सप्त पदार्था निर्धारिताः, एतावन्त एवंरूपाश्चेति, ते तथैव वा स्युः, नैव वा तथा स्युः, इतरथा हि तथा वा स्युः, अतथा वेति अनिर्धारितरूपं ŞLİ ÁRPşınaq Sy | B.S.B., II.I.33). Jainas may say that, reality has many aspects is a definite knowledge, it cannot be invalid like doubt (ननु अनेकात्मकं वस्तु इति निर्धारितरूपमेव ज्ञानमुत्पद्यमानं संशयज्ञानवत् न अप्रमाणं भवितुमर्हति । B.S.B., II.II.33). Śankara argues that, to say like this, that cognition of a thing can assume manyness or more than one nature and is a definite piece of knowledge, is itself untrue, for applying same reasoning, this socalled definite knowledge, may or may not be definite. In other words, if you apply Syādvāda unrestrictedly for every object without exception, the definiteness of knowledge itself being equally an object of knowledge, would come under the application of such alternations as 'may be it exists', 'may be it does not exist' and so on and hence, this knowledge would have an indifinite nature all the same (निरङ्कुशं हि अनेकान्तत्वं सर्ववस्तुषु प्रतिजानानस्य, निर्धारणस्यापि वस्तुत्वाविशेषात्, स्यादस्ति, स्यान्नास्ति इत्यादि विकल्पोपनिपातात् अनिर्धारणात्मकता एव स्यात् । (B.S.B., II.II.33)
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